Crime Investigation in India is governed by various legislations as also a number of legal precedents.
As regards legislations, it is governed by Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Offences governed by Indian Penal Code 1860 besides other specialised laws e.g. Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Evidence of witnesses during trial is to be evaluated on the touch stone of Evidence Act, 1872.
Apart from above legislations, there are numerous directions, guidelines and cautions by Supreme Court to protect the personal liberty, human rights and human dignity under article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Crime investigation is the domain of police but in case of economic or other classes of crimes some other departments are also authorised to investigate. More importantly the matters of national security are investigated by National Investigation Agency or NIA for short. But all these agencies are bound by same laws barring few exceptions.
The commencement of an investigation happens when a crime is committed. The First Chapter is in regard to introduction to the Crime and Offences.
While considering a plea for transfer, the convenience of parties would be a relevant consideration. It can’t just be the convenience of the petitioner but also of the Complainant, the Witnesses,the Prosecution besides the larger issue of trial being conducted under the jurisdictional Court. When relative convenience and difficulties of all the parties involved in the process are taken into account, it is clear that the petitioner has failed to make out a credible case for transfer of trial to alternative venues outside the State.
Credibility of Judiciary:
The transfer of trials from one state to another would inevitably reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary and but for compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair justice, the transfer power should not be invoked. This case is not perceived to be one of those exceptional categories.
Journalist involved in property disputes:
When the nature of the three cases are examined,it is seen that two of the cases are property and Will related matters. One of this case is pending for last over a decade. Therefore, this court finds it difficult to accept that the cases are on account of journalistic activities of the petitioner. In fact the credibility of the journalistic activity of the petitioner is itself questioned, by a member of his sting operation team, in the third case. In such circumstances, the prosecution in the concerned three cases can’t prima facie be said to be on account of malicious prosecution.
The appellants relied on Statute No. 16.24 of the University, applicable to them,contending that they were entitled to continue beyond the last date of the month in which each of them attained the age of superannuation, till the “30th of June following”in terms of that provision. That statute reads as follows:
“16.24 (1) The age of superannuation of a teacher of the University, whether governed by the new scale of pay or not shall be sixty-five years.(2) No extension in service beyond the age of superannuation shall be granted to any teacher after the date of commencement of these statutes.provided that a teacher whose date of superannuation does not fall on June 30, shall continue on service till the end of the academic session, that is June 30, following and will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately following his superannuation till June, 30, following.(Provided further that such physically and mentally fit teachers shall be reappointed for a further period of two years, after June, 30, following the date of their superannuation as were imprisoned for taking part in freedom struggle of 1942 and are getting freedom fighters pension) Provided also that the teachers who were re-appointed in accordance with the second proviso as it existed prior to the commencement to the Kumaun University (Twenty-third amendment) First Statute, 1988 and a period ofone year has not elapsed after the expiry of the period of their reemployment, may be considered for re-appointment for a further period of one year.”
India, as we know it today, traces its foundation back to when the seeds of protest during our freedom struggle were sown deep, to eventually flower into a democracy. What must be kept in mind, however, is that the erstwhile mode and manner of dissent against colonial rule cannot be equated with dissent in a self-ruled democracy.
Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice.
It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare decisis, etc. These rules and principle are based on public policy.
The rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can be easily comprehended.
The mighty says to the meek that you cannot command me to act; I shall act if f like, I shall not act if I choose not to act. The meek says that I possess the strength of law to give you the command; the law, which is no respector of person and which does not allow anybody to rise so high as to be above it.
Cuttack was calm when the day dawned. Who had known that a “disaster of unprecedented proportions” was going to strike and disturb placid waters of the Mahanadi and Katha-jodi? But it took place. A man-made tragedy took a great toll 124 deaths, according to the State), and it was our well known hooch tragedy. Not that the people of this State have not know a about such tragedies taking place in the past, but then, it was the great dimension of the tragedy which stunned the people, so much so that they almost lost faith in all instrumentalities of the State. People started thinking whether they had been left to the wolves to be killed. The question with which we are seized is about the responsibility of the State to find out why spurious liquor took the toll of 124 lives, and what steps are required to be taken to stop recurrence of such a heinous crime, at the root of which lies the naked greed for money and nothing else.
Learned counsel for the complainant vehemently contended that the appellant had duped him of a considerable amount of money and that looking to the seriousness of the allegations against him, this was not a case in which the appellant ought to be granted bail by this Court. Learned counsel supported the view taken by the trial judge as well as by the Allahabad High Court. He argued that given the conduct of the appellant in not only cheating the complainant and depriving him of a considerable sum of money but thereafter issuing a cheque for which payment was stopped made it an appropriate case for dismissal.
Conduct of Investigation:
During the entire period of investigations which appear to have been spread over seven months, the appellant was not arrested by the investigating officer. Even when the appellant apprehended that he might be arrested after the charge sheet was filed against him, he was not arrested for a considerable period of time. When he approached the Allahabad High Court for quashing the FIR lodged against him, he was granted two months time to appear before the trial judge. All these facts are an indication that there was no apprehension that the appellant would abscond or would hamper the trial in any manner. That being the case, the trial judge, as well as the High Court ought to have judiciously exercised discretion and granted bail to the appellant. It is nobody’s case that the appellant is a shady character and there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant had earlier been involved in any unacceptable activity, let alone any alleged illegal activity.
The presumption against the accused of culpability under Section 35, and under Section 54 of the Act to explain possession satisfactorily, are rebuttable.
Presumption does not dispense with the obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The presumptive provision with reverse burden of proof, does not sanction conviction on basis of preponderance of probability. Section 35(2) provides that a fact can be said to have been proved if it is established beyond reasonable doubt and not on preponderance of probability. That the right of the accused to a fair trial could not be whittled down under the Act was considered in Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 observing:
“58. … An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt of the accused on the prosecution is “beyond all reasonable doubt” but it is “preponderance of probability” on the accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus which is possession of contraband by the accused cannot be said to have been established. 59. With a view to bring within its purview the requirements of Section 54 of the Act, element of possession of the contraband was essential so as to shift the burden on the accused. The provisions being exceptions to the general rule, the generality thereof would continue to be operative, namely, the element of possession will have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”