Law of Joint Property, it’s Ownership and Partition:
Right to own property in India dates back to over 5000 years and if we go by ancient scriptures, at least 2000 years. If Indians call their country motherland, they call the land they own, as their mother; the provider of all needs, from nourishment to shelter. In other words the attachment to land is a matter of emotion and not purely of law.
It is for this reason, the British Government as the colonial rulers over India in 1893, enacted a unique law called Partition Act, 1893. This law along with other laws and the ancient principles of Hindu Law govern the ownership of property which is owned by by more than one person. This book deals with all the nuances of law relating to ownership, enjoyment and partition of this property including the principles on which the property can be forced to be sold by public auction by court.
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The facts on record thus indicate with clarity that:
(a) There was no delay in holding the test identification parade and the delay, if any, was attributable to the fact that one of the accused was in judicial custody whose presence had to be secured only after appropriate permissions from the court;
India follows it’s own law against obscenity. This is an Opuscule of Law of Obscenity in India:
The aim of this opusculum is to apprise the law against obscenity as it happens around the globe while comparing it with Indian laws and its interpretation. These initial chapters would clinch the subject of obscenity. For advanced readers the detailed analysis of judgements with its citations would be of special interest. This book is a part of series aimed at students and common people interested in understanding the relevant law while also going into a mild debate that is required from a Legal Commentary.
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Liability of Intermediary u/s. 79 of Information Technology Act.
The problem arises in this way however. It is while considering a challenge to Section 79 of the Act, after it was substituted with effect from 27.10.2009 and considering the Rules made in the year 2011 also, and a challenge to the same also, that in Shreya Singhal (supra), the provisions were read down to mean that Section 79(3)(b) of the Act and Rule 3(4) of the Rules, would require an internet service operator to take-down third-party information not on mere knowledge of objection to its continuance but after there has been an impartial adjudication as it were by a court. To focus more on the problem, it must be pointed out that in the facts of this case, the acts constituting the alleged offence under Section 499 of the IPC, were done not when Section 79, after its substitution, was in place. The Rules were enacted in the year 2011. In such circumstances, what we are asked to do is to import in the principles into the factual matrix when Section 79 was differently worded and in proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.PC. It is, undoubtedly, true that Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India were very much available in 2008 and 2009 though Section 79 was in its erstwhile avtar. In other words, will it not be open to the appellant, assuming it to be the intermediary, to contend that it cannot be called upon to remove, defamatory matter comprised in any third-party information without there being a court order? Continue reading “Quashing of proceedings at the behest of an intermediary”→
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34:
There were a dispute between NHPC Ltd. and a foreign contractor, clause 67.3(vi) would have to be read as a clause designating the “seat” of arbitration, the same must follow even when sub-clause (vi) is to be read with sub-clause (i) of Clause 67.3, where the dispute between NHPC Ltd. would be with an Indian Contractor.
The arbitration clause in the present case states that “Arbitration Proceedings shall be held at New Delhi/Faridabad, India…”, thereby signifying that all the hearings, including the making of the award, are to take place at one of the stated places. Negatively speaking, the clause does not state that the venue is so that some, or all, of the hearings take place at the venue; neither does it use language such as “the Tribunal may meet”, or “may hear witnesses, experts or parties”. The expression “shall be held” also indicates that the so-called “venue” is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings. The dispute is to be settled in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1996 which, therefore, applies a national body of rules to the arbitration that is to be held either at New Delhi or Faridabad, given the fact that the present arbitration would be Indian and not international. It is clear, therefore, that even in such a scenario, New Delhi/Faridabad, India has been designated as the “seat” of the arbitration proceedings.
While the learned Judge was empowered to look at the materials produced in a sealed cover to satisfy his judicial conscience, the learned Judge ought not to have recorded finding based on the materials produced in a sealed cover. Further while deciding the same case of the appellant in Crl. Appeal No.1340 of 2019, after holding so, this Court had consciously refrained from opening the sealed cover and perusing the documents lest some observations are made thereon after perusal of the same, which would prejudice the accused pre-trial. In that circumstance though it is held that it would be open for the Court to peruse the documents, it would be against the concept of fair trial if in every case the prosecution presents documents in sealed cover and the findings on the same are recorded as if the offence is committed and the same is treated as having a bearing for denial or grant of bail.
Having said so, in present circumstance we were not very much inclined to open the sealed cover although the materials in sealed cover was received from the respondent. However, since the learned Single Judge of the High Court had perused the documents in sealed cover and arrived at certain conclusion and since that order is under challenge, it had become imperative for us to also open the sealed cover and peruse the contents so as to satisfy ourselves to that extent. On perusal we have taken note that the statements of persons concerned have been recorded and the details collected have been collated. The recording of statements and the collation of material is in the nature of allegation against one of the co-accused Karti Chidambaram- son of appellant of opening shell companies and also purchasing benami properties in the name of relatives at various places in different countries. Except for recording the same, we do not wish to advert to the documents any further since ultimately, these are allegations which would have to be established in the trial wherein the accused/co-accused would have the opportunity of putting forth their case, if any, and an ultimate conclusion would be reached. Hence in our opinion, the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the High Court based on the material in sealed cover is not justified.