The discretion of the arbitrator to award interest must be exercised reasonably.
An arbitral tribunal while making an award for Interest must take into consideration a host of factors, such as:
(i) the ‘loss of use’ of the principal sum;
(ii) the types of sums to which the Interest must apply;
(iii) the time period over which interest should be awarded;
(iv) the internationally prevailing rates of interest;
(v) whether simple or compound rate of interest is to be applied;
(vi) whether the rate of interest awarded is commercially prudent from an economic standpoint;
(vii) the rates of inflation,
(viii) proportionality of the count awarded as Interest to the principal sums awarded.
Continue reading “Award of Interest by Arbitrator”
Meaning of “development agreement”:
The expression “development agreement” has not been defined statutorily. In a sense, it is a catch-all nomenclature which is used to be describe a wide range of agreements which an owner of a property may enter into for development of immovable property. As real estate transactions have grown in complexity, the nature of these agreements has become increasingly intricate. Broadly speaking, (without intending to be exhaustive), development agreements may be of various kinds:
(i) An agreement may envisage that the owner of the immovable property engages someone to carry out the work of construction on the property for monetary consideration. This is a pure construction contract;
(ii) An agreement by which the owner or a person holding other rights in an immovable property grants rights to a third party to carry on development for a monetary consideration payable by the developer to the other. In such a situation, the owner or right holder may in effect create an interest in the property in favour of the developer for a monetary consideration;
(iii) An agreement where the owner or a person holding any other rights in an immovable property grants rights to another person to carry out development. In consideration, the developer has to hand over a part of the constructed area to the owner. The developer is entitled to deal with the balance of the constructed area. In some situations, a society or similar other association is formed and the land is conveyed or leased to the society or association;
(iv) A development agreement may be entered into in a situation where the immovable property is occupied by tenants or other right holders. In some cases, the property may be encroached upon. The developer may take on the entire responsibility to settle with the occupants and to thereafter carry out construction; and
(v) An owner may negotiate with a developer to develop a plot of land which is occupied by slum dwellers and which has been declared as a slum. Alternately, there may be old and dilapidated buildings which are occupied by a number of occupants or tenants. The developer may undertake to rehabilitate the occupants or, as the case may be, the slum dwellers and thereafter share the saleable constructed area with the owner. Continue reading “Specific Performance of Development Agreement between Builder and Owner”
Conviction under Prevention of Corruption Act.
Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the court must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. In order to accept extra-judicial confession, it must be voluntary and must inspire confidence. If the court is satisfied that the extra-judicial confession is voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the conviction.
Misappropriation of funds u/s 409 of IPC:
Continue reading “Conviction on the basis of Extra Judicial Confession.”
Gall bladder surgery:
Initially Doctor proceeded to perform the laparoscopy surgery of the Gall Bladder of respondent No.1 as advised but while so performing he noticed some inflammation, adhesion and swelling on the Gall Bladder and, therefore, decided to perform the conventional surgery, which he actually did on respondent No.1, to remove the Gall Bladder.
Allegations that even the surgery performed was not successful inasmuch as respondent No.1 thereafter suffered for several days with various ailments, such as dysentery, loss of appetite, reduction of weight, jaundice etc., Thirdly, in June 1997, she was, therefore, required to undergo another Surgery in Ganga Ram Hospital, Delhi for removal of stones which had slipped in Common Bile Duct. It was alleged that all these ailments were incurred due to the negligence of the appellant, who did not perform the surgery properly. Continue reading “Proof of medical negligence by Doctor”
The arrest of Urban Naxals
The locus standi of the petitioners:
Five illustrious persons in their own field have filed this petition on 29th August, 2018 complaining about the high- handed action of the Maharashtra Police in raiding the homes and arresting five well known human rights activists, journalists, advocates and political worker, with a view to kill independent voices differing in ideology from the party in power and to stifle the honest voice of dissent. They complain that the five activists, namely, Gautam Navalakha, Sudha Signature Not Verified Bharadwaj, Varavara Rao, Arun Ferreira and Vernon Gonsalves were arrested on 28th August, 2018 from their homes at New Delhi, Faridabad, Mumbai, Thane and Hyderabad, respectively, without any credible material and evidence against them justifying their arrest, purportedly in connection with FIR No.0004/2018 dated 8th January, 2018 registered with Police Station Vishram Bagh, Pune City. This action was to silence the dissent, stop people from helping the poor and downtrodden and to instill fear in the minds of people and was a motivated action to deflect people‟s attention from real issues. The petitioners have made it clear in their petition that they were seriously concerned about the erosion of democratic values and were approaching this Court “not to stop investigation into allegations” “but” to ensure independent and credible “investigation into the arrest of stated five human rights activists.”
Continue reading “Judicial Review of arrest by Supreme Court under article 32 of Constitution”
Right of privacy of consenting adult:
i. The offence of “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” has not been defined in Section 377. It is too wide, and open-ended, and would take within its sweep, and criminalise even sexual acts of consenting adults in private.
A distinction has to be made between consensual relationships of adults in private, whether they are heterosexual or homosexual in nature. Furthermore, consensual relationships between adults cannot be classified along with offences of bestiality, sodomy and non-consensual relationships. Sexual orientation is immutable, since it is an innate feature of one’s identity, and cannot be changed at will. The choice of LGBT persons to enter into intimate sexual relations with persons of the same sex is an exercise of their personal choice, and an expression of their autonomy and self-determination.
Section 377 insofar as it criminalises voluntary sexual relations between LGBT persons of the same sex in private, discriminates against them on the basis of their “sexual orientation” which is violative of their fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Continue reading “Section 377 of Penal Code not applicable to LGBT community.”
Application of Limitation Act, 1963 on Election Petition under Representation of People Act.
The first respondent filed an election petition in the first instance to which there was an objection to maintainability under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Confronted with the objection under Order 7 Rule 11, the first respondent obviated a decision thereon by withdrawing the election petition. The grant of liberty to file a fresh election petition cannot obviate the bar of limitation. The fresh election petition filed by the first respondent was beyond the statutory period of 30 days and was hence liable to be rejected. Continue reading “Delay in filing election petition”
Supreme Court Refused to countermand West Bengal Panchayat Elections:
These were the reasons given by Supreme Court for declining to interfere:
“[I]t would be inappropriate for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction to interdict the declaration of results of the uncontested seats. First and foremost, it is necessary for the Court to notice that no specific relief was claimed before the High Court in regard to those seats where there was no contest. Neither were there adequate pleadings nor indeed were specific prayers set up before the High Court when its jurisdiction under Article 226 was invoked. The proceedings before the High Court were brought by several political parties, each of whom would have been well aware of the situation on the ground and the need to formulate an adequate basis in fact to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court. Absent such a factual foundation, the High Court dealt with the only issue which had been addressed, which was the plea that nominations should be allowed to be filed in the electronic form. No other plea was raised.
Continue reading “West Bengal Panchayat Elections”
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950; Section 13.
It is evident from Section 13(3) of the Rent Act that the use of the word ‘shall’ puts a mandatory obligation on the court to fix provisional rent within three months of the filing of the written statement but before framing of the issues. The language of the Section is mandatory and places a duty on the court to determine the provisional rent irrespective of any application or not. If the rent so determined by the court is paid by the tenant as provided under Section 13(4), no decree for eviction of the tenant can be passed on the ground of default under Section 13(1)(a) in view of Section 13(6) of the Act. It is thus clear that unless the determination under Section 13(3) takes place, Section 13(6) cannot be complied with and a valuable right given to a tenant would be lost. The High Court, in our view, has rightly held Section 13(3) of the Act to be mandatory.
Whether Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which provides for a moratorium for the limited period mentioned in the Code, on admission of an insolvency petition, would apply to a personal guarantor of a corporate debtor?
The amended Section reads as follows:
“14. Moratorium.— xxx xxx xxx (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to—
(a) such transactions as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator;
(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.”
The Insolvency Law Committee, appointed by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, by its Report dated 26.03.2018, made certain key recommendations like:
“…….since many guarantees for loans of corporates are given by its promoters in the form of personal guarantees, if there is a stay on actions against their assets during a CIRP, such promoters (who are also corporate applicants) may file frivolous applications to merely take advantage of the stay and guard their assets. In the judgments analysed in this relation, many have been filed by the corporate applicant under Section 10 of the Code and this may corroborate the above apprehension of abuse of the moratorium provision.
The Committee concluded that Section 14 does not intend to bar actions against assets of guarantors to the debts of the corporate debtor and recommended that an explanation to clarify this may be inserted in Section 14 of the Code. The scope of the moratorium may be restricted to the assets of the corporate debtor only.”
The Report of the said Committee makes it clear that the object of the amendment was to clarify and set at rest what the Committee thought was an overbroad interpretation of Section 14. That such clarificatory amendment is retrospective in nature.
“In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is ‘to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. The language ‘shall be deemed always to have meant’ is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. In the absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is declaratory, it would not be so construed when the pre-amended provision was clear and unambiguous. An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law which the Constitution came into force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law.”