Attempt to murder

Difference between attempt to murder and causing grievous hurt.

Penal Code, 1860, Section 307 and 324:

307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.—When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death. Continue reading “Attempt to murder”

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Procedure for speedy justice in matters of dishonour of cheques.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Compounding the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on payment of the cheque amount and in the alternative for exemption from personal appearance.
How the proceedings for an offence under Section 138 of the Act can be regulated where the accused is willing to deposit the cheque amount? Whether in such a case, the proceedings can be closed or exemption granted from personal appearance or any other order can be passed?

i) Offence under Section 138 of the Act is primarily a civil wrong. Burden of proof is on accused in view presumption under Section 139 but the standard of such proof is “preponderance of probabilities”. The same has to be normally tried summarily as per provisions of summary trial under the Cr.P.C. but with such variation as may be appropriate to proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Act. Thus read, principle of Section 258 Cr.P.C. will apply and the Court can close the proceedings and discharge the accused on satisfaction that the cheque amount with assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect.

ii) The object of the provision being primarily compensatory, punitive element being mainly with the object of enforcing the compensatory element, compounding at the initial stage has to be encouraged but is not debarred at later stage subject to appropriate compensation as may be found acceptable to the parties or the Court. Continue reading “Procedure for speedy justice in matters of dishonour of cheques.”

Malice in law is different from malice in fact

Mens rea not necessary to prove malice of law:

Rule of law:

The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously.

[Source A.K. Kaipak vs. Union of India, A. 1. R. 1970 SC 150]
Malice in fact and in law.

Continue reading “Malice in law is different from malice in fact”

Claim of depreciation u/s. 80-IA of Income Tax Act, 1961

Deduction for depreciation u/s. 80-IA of Income Tax Act, 1961

Whether claim for deduction on account of depreciation under Section 80-IA is the choice of the assessees or it has to be necessarily taken into consideration while computing the income under this provision?

Section 80-IA of the IT Act at relevant time was as under:

“80-IA. Deductions in respect of profits and gains from industrial undertakings etc., in certain cases.- (1) Where the gross total income of an assessee includes any profits and gains derived from any business of an industrial undertaking or a hotel or operation of a ship or developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility or scientific and industrial research and development or providing telecommunication services whether basic or cellular including radio paging, domestic satellite service or network of trunking and electronic data interchange services or construction and development of housing projects or operating an industrial park or commercial production or refining of mineral oil in the North Eastern Region or in any part of India on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 (such business being hereinafter referred to as the eligible business), to which this section applies, there shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to the percentage specified in sub-section (5) and for such number of assessment years as is specified in sub-section (6).”

Continue reading “Claim of depreciation u/s. 80-IA of Income Tax Act, 1961”

Revisional jurisdiction of National Consumer Commission

Dismissal of complaint itself in Revision by Complainant:

Can National Commission dismiss a complaint on a ground which was not raised by the opposite party alone?

Please note that except Limitation Act, no law enjoins a court to reject a claim on its own. In an adversary litigation, objection has to be pleaded by one party and responded by the other party.  Following this principles, the Supreme Court set aside order of National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission with following observations:

5. At the outset, we may notice that this was not a defence raised by the respondent either before the District Forum or before the State Commission. In fact, the respondent had not even challenged the order of the State Commission. In our view, the National Commission, in a revision petition filed by the complainant praying for increase of compensation and payment of interest, could not have dismissed the petition itself. We, therefore, set aside the order of the National Commission.

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Assault and criminal intimidation on facebook

Aggressive comment on Facebook page of Police

Whether Facebook page of the Bengaluru traffic police is a public forum meant for citizens to discuss and post their grievances and whether  the comment  posted on the Facebook could prima facie constitute the offence of assault and criminal intimidation?

 Section 353 defines assault and is as under:

353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”

A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out. Continue reading “Assault and criminal intimidation on facebook”

Custodial Interrogation to obtain confession is not permissible

Non-cooperation of accused with investigator:

Petition for cancellation of bail on the allegations that accused refused to confess to the I.O. if permissible?

“…It appears, the IO was of the view that the custody of the appellant is required for recording his confessional statement in terms of what the co-accused had already stated in the Statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The IO was of the opinion that the appellant was not cooperating because he kept reiterating that he had not purchased the food-grains. The purpose of custodial interrogation is not just for the purpose of confession. The right against self-incrimination is provided for in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It is a well settled position in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Selvi and others v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263, that Article 20(3) enjoys an “exalted status”. This provision is an essential safeguard in criminal procedure and is also meant to be a vital safeguard against torture and other coercive methods used by investigating authorities. Therefore, merely because the appellant did not confess, it cannot be said that the appellant was not cooperating with the investigation. However, in case, there is no co-operation on the part of the appellant for the completion of the investigation, it will certainly be open to the respondent to seek for cancellation of bail.

Continue reading “Custodial Interrogation to obtain confession is not permissible”

Marital rape with a girl below 18 years

Sexual intercourse with a bride below 18 years if a rape.

Whether sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age is rape? 

Exception 2 to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the IPC) answers this in the negative, but in our opinion sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not. The exception carved out in the IPC creates an unnecessary and artificial distinction between a married girl child and an unmarried girl child and has no rational nexus with any unclear objective sought to be achieved.

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Arbitration clause does not bar jurisdiction of Rent Controller or Civil Court

Arbitration clause in lease deed does no bar suit for eviction

Can tenant invoke arbitration clause in the face of civil suit by landlord:

In the light of the foregoing discussion and the authority of the precedents, we hold that both by reason of Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and by reason of the broader considerations of public policy mentioned by us earlier and also in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain, the Court of Small Causes has and the arbitrator has not the jurisdiction to decide the question whether the respondent-licensor landlord is entitled to seek possession of the two Studios and other premises together with machinery and equipment from the appellant-licensee tenant. That this is the real dispute between the parties is abundantly clear from the petition filed by the respondents in the High Court of Bombay, under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act seeking a reference to Arbitration. The petition refers to the notices exchanged by the parties, the respondent calling upon the appellant to hand over possession of the Studios to him and the appellant claiming to be a tenant or protected licensee in respect of the Studios. The relationship between the parties being that of licensor-landlord and licensee tenant and the dispute between them relating to the possession of the licensed demised premises, there is no help from the conclusion that the Court of Small Causes alone has the jurisdiction and the arbitrator has none to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties.”

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Conviction for corruption on circumstantial evidence

Conviction under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read as hereunder:-

(d) if he,–

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or Section 13(2) in The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

For establishing the offence under the aforesaid sections, the ingredients of the public servant having abused his position and by abusing that position he has obtained for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, has to be proved Continue reading “Conviction for corruption on circumstantial evidence”