Criminal Law in India:
Crime investigation and trial of offences in India is governed by Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Offences governed by Indian Penal Code 1860 besides other specialised laws e.g. Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Evidence of witnesses during trial is to be evaluated on the touch stone of Evidence Act, 1872. Children and Juvenile have special law called JJ Act. Prison Conditions are governed by Prisons Act.
Apart from above legislations, there are numerous directions, guidelines and cautions by Supreme Court to protect the personal liberty, human rights and human dignity under article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This book is an attempt to assimilate basic knowledge from all these sources so as to assist in each stage of criminal proceedings starting with crime investigation, bail, trial and even after the conviction and sentencing of a person.
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Corruption in India
India is the only living ancient civilization which will soon be the most populous country in the World. Corruption remains India’s biggest problem. In last about 72 years since India’s independence, numerous laws and authorities have been created by India to deal with the menace of corruption.
Even though several Chief Ministers, Ministers, Officials etc. are serving sentences of imprisonment in different prisons, the menace of corruption has not subsided. Since 2014 the India may have improved it’s transparency rating but this does not change the ground realities of laws and enforcement authorities which are placed in a precarious flip flop course.
A Kindle ebook on Corruption:
Continue reading “Corruption in India (History, Law and Politics)”
Defect in Test Identification Parade:
The facts on record thus indicate with clarity that:
(a) There was no delay in holding the test identification parade and the delay, if any, was attributable to the fact that one of the accused was in judicial custody whose presence had to be secured only after appropriate permissions from the court;
(b) It is not the case of the accused that Accused No.6 was ever shown to any of the witnesses. The test identification parade of Accused No.6 has no infirmity on any count and all the witnesses consistently identified said Accused No.6; Continue reading “Procedure for Test Identification Parade”
Liability of Intermediary u/s. 79 of Information Technology Act.
The problem arises in this way however. It is while considering a challenge to Section 79 of the Act, after it was substituted with effect from 27.10.2009 and considering the Rules made in the year 2011 also, and a challenge to the same also, that in Shreya Singhal (supra), the provisions were read down to mean that Section 79(3)(b) of the Act and Rule 3(4) of the Rules, would require an internet service operator to take-down third-party information not on mere knowledge of objection to its continuance but after there has been an impartial adjudication as it were by a court. To focus more on the problem, it must be pointed out that in the facts of this case, the acts constituting the alleged offence under Section 499 of the IPC, were done not when Section 79, after its substitution, was in place. The Rules were enacted in the year 2011. In such circumstances, what we are asked to do is to import in the principles into the factual matrix when Section 79 was differently worded and in proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.PC. It is, undoubtedly, true that Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India were very much available in 2008 and 2009 though Section 79 was in its erstwhile avtar. In other words, will it not be open to the appellant, assuming it to be the intermediary, to contend that it cannot be called upon to remove, defamatory matter comprised in any third-party information without there being a court order? Continue reading “Quashing of proceedings at the behest of an intermediary”
Consideration of documents in sealed cover:
While the learned Judge was empowered to look at the materials produced in a sealed cover to satisfy his judicial conscience, the learned Judge ought not to have recorded finding based on the materials produced in a sealed cover. Further while deciding the same case of the appellant in Crl. Appeal No.1340 of 2019, after holding so, this Court had consciously refrained from opening the sealed cover and perusing the documents lest some observations are made thereon after perusal of the same, which would prejudice the accused pre-trial. In that circumstance though it is held that it would be open for the Court to peruse the documents, it would be against the concept of fair trial if in every case the prosecution presents documents in sealed cover and the findings on the same are recorded as if the offence is committed and the same is treated as having a bearing for denial or grant of bail.
Having said so, in present circumstance we were not very much inclined to open the sealed cover although the materials in sealed cover was received from the respondent. However, since the learned Single Judge of the High Court had perused the documents in sealed cover and arrived at certain conclusion and since that order is under challenge, it had become imperative for us to also open the sealed cover and peruse the contents so as to satisfy ourselves to that extent. On perusal we have taken note that the statements of persons concerned have been recorded and the details collected have been collated. The recording of statements and the collation of material is in the nature of allegation against one of the co-accused Karti Chidambaram- son of appellant of opening shell companies and also purchasing benami properties in the name of relatives at various places in different countries. Except for recording the same, we do not wish to advert to the documents any further since ultimately, these are allegations which would have to be established in the trial wherein the accused/co-accused would have the opportunity of putting forth their case, if any, and an ultimate conclusion would be reached. Hence in our opinion, the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the High Court based on the material in sealed cover is not justified.
Grant of Bail:
Continue reading “P. Chidambram is entitled to bail, says Supreme Court of India”
Terrorism in India:
The country has been in the firm grip of spiralling terrorist violence and is caught between deadly pangs of disruptive activities. Apart from many skirmishes in various parts of the country, there were countless serious and horrendous events engulfing many cities with blood bath, firing, looting, mad killing even without sparing women and children and reducing those areas into a graveyard, which brutal atrocities have rocked and shocked the whole nation. Deplorably determined youth, lured by hard-core criminals and underground extremists and attracted by the ideology of terrorism are indulging in committing serious crimes against the humanity.
Terrorism is an evil affecting the life and liberty of peace loving people. Terrorism has no barriers, it may strike anybody anytime, any amount of precautionary measures and security arrangements may prove futile to combat terrorism. Fundamental rights to individual liberty is certainly valuable. But when it is pitted against the life and liberty of the people at large, it becomes insignificant. Terrorism effects the growth of the nation. The resources of the nation have to be utilized to combat terrorism: it could be utilized in better ways for the betterment of the people. Offences against individuals are to be distinguished from offences affecting nation and people at large. Parameters to be adopted in the matter of considering the pleas of bail would also be different in these cases. A strict approach in the latter category of cases is justified. Sympathy has no rule in dealing with such cases. Continue reading “Terrorism is a crime against humanity.”
Principles for repeal and re-enactment of a law:
If the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is the basis upon which the doctrine of implied repeal is founded could there be any incongruity in attributing to the later legislation the same intent which Section 6 presumes where the word ‘repeal’ is expressly used. So far as statutory construction is concerned, it is one of the cardinal principles of the law that there is no distinction or difference between an express provision and a provision which is necessarily implied, for it is only the form that differs in the two cases and there is no difference in intention or in substance. A repeal may be brought about by repugnant legislation, without even any reference to the Act intended to be repealed, for once legislative competence to effect a repeal is posited, it matters little whether this is done expressly or inferentially or by the enactment of repugnant legislation. If such is the basis upon which repeals and implied repeals are brought about it appears to us to be both logical as well as in accordance with the principles upon which the rule as to implied repeal rests to attribute to that legislature which effects a repeal by necessary implication the same intention as that which would attend the case of an express repeal. Where an intention to effect a repeal is attributed to a legislature then the same would, in our opinion, attract the incident of the saving found in Section 6 for the rules of construction embodied in the General Clauses Act are, so to speak, the basic assumptions on which statutes are drafted. Continue reading “Repeal and re-enactment of a law”
The principles for prosecution are summarized hereunder :
I. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime.
II. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. III. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under section 197 Cr.P.C. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor it is possible to lay down such rule.
IV. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply. V. In case sanction is necessary it has to be decided by competent authority and sanction has to be issued on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court is not to be a sanctioning authority. VI. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of Court at a later stage, finding to that effect is permissible and such a plea can be taken first time before appellate Court. It may arise at inception itself. There is no requirement that accused must wait till charges are framed. Continue reading “Sanction for prosecution of public servant on official duty.”
Failure to maintain diary:
As the concept of maintaining General Diary has its origin under the Section 44 of Police Act of 1861 as applicable to States, which makes it an obligation for the concerned Police Officer to maintain a General Diary, but such non maintenance per se may not be rendering the whole prosecution illegal. However, on the other hand, we are aware of the fact that such nonmaintenance of General Diary may have consequences on the merits of the case, which is a matter of trial. Moreover, we are also aware of the fact that the explanation of the genesis of a criminal case, in some cases, plays an important role in establishing the prosecution’s case. With this background discussion we must observe that the binding conclusions reached in the paragraph 120.8 of Lalitha Kumari Case (Supra) is an obligation of best efforts for the concerned officer to record all events concerning an enquiry. If the Officer has not recorded, then it is for the trial court to weigh the effect of the same for reasons provided therein. A court under a writ jurisdiction or under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is ill equipped to answer such questions of facts. The treatment provided by the High Court in converting a mixed question of law and fact concerning the merits of the case, into a pure question of law may not be proper in light of settled jurisprudence.
Our conclusion herein is strengthened by the fact that CrPC itself has differentiated between irregularity and illegality. The obligation of maintenance of General Diary is part of course of conduct of the concerned officer, which may not itself have any bearing on the criminal trial unless some grave prejudice going to the root of matter is shown to exist at the time of the trial.1 Conspicuous absence of any provision under CrPC concerning the omissions and errors during investigation also bolsters the conclusion reached herein.
A self professed terrorist:
We are unable to accept the submission that the appellant was a mere tool in the hands of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. He joined the Lashkar-e-Toiba around December 2007 and continued as its member till the end, despite a number of opportunities to leave it. This shows his clear and unmistakable intention to be a part of the organization and participate in its designs. Even after his arrest he regarded himself as a “watan parast”, a patriotic Pakistani at war with this country. Where is the question of his being brain-washed or acting under remote control? We completely disagree that the appellant was acting like an automaton. During the past months while we lived through this case we have been able to make a fair assessment of the appellant’s personality. It is true that he is not educated but he is a very good and quick learner, has a tough mind and strong determination. He is also quite clever and shrewd. Unfortunately, he is wholly remorseless and any feeling of pity is unknown to him. He kills without the slightest twinge of conscience. Leaving aside all the massacre, we may here refer only to the casualness with which the appellant and his associate Abu Ismail shot down Gupta Bhelwala and the shanty dwellers Thakur Waghela and Bhagan Shinde at Badruddin Tayabji Marg; the attempt to break into the wards of Cama Hospital to kill the women and children who were crying and wailing inside; and the nonchalance with which he and Abu Ismail gunned down the police officer Durgude on coming out of Cama Hospital.
The saddest and the most disturbing part of the case is that the appellant never showed any remorse for the terrible things he did. As seen earlier, in the initial weeks after his arrest he continued to regard himself as a “watan parast”, a patriotic Pakistani who considered himself to be at war with this country, who had no use for an Indian lawyer but needed a Pakistani lawyer to defend him in the court. He made the confessional statement before the magistrate on February 17, 2009, not out of any sense of guilt or sorrow or grief but to present himself as a hero. He told the magistrate that he had absolutely no regret for whatever he had done and he wanted to make the confession to set an example for others to become Fidayeen like him and follow him in his deeds. Continue reading “Death sentence to remorseless terrorist”